Cybersecurity

Optimizely hack put card skimmers and iPhone exploits on Zoom, BBC and CNN

Susan Hill
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For much of a day, people who opened Zoom, the BBC, CNN or HSBC in a browser were also running code written by a criminal. The code did not come from those companies’ servers. It came from Optimizely, a service big websites use to test page designs on their own visitors, and it was built to swap cryptocurrency wallet addresses, copy card numbers and, on iPhones and iPads, try to break into the device.

The sites did nothing wrong in the usual sense. They loaded a small script from a supplier they trusted, as thousands of websites do, and the attacker changed what that script contained. Anyone who typed a card number into one of those pages, copied a crypto address from one, or browsed one on an out-of-date iPhone has a reason to check.

Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI, a firm that monitors the scripts websites run, first reported the attack. His team checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. Besides Zoom, the BBC, CNN and HSBC, the list includes Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, Equifax, Air France-KLM, the hardware-wallet maker Ledger, Peacock, Fox News and NPR. Optimizely’s own homepage and login page carried it too. Helme says the real total is probably higher, because his team could only check the snippets it found in time.

Optimizely confirmed the attack. An unauthorised party “exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow” and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, the company told BleepingComputer and Gizmodo. It says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and notified every affected customer. Because the poisoned file still came from Optimizely’s own servers, with its own security certificate, the usual advice to allow scripts only from trusted sources did nothing here.

The script did several jobs at once. It replaced real wallet addresses on the page and in the clipboard with the attacker’s, so an address copied from an affected tab could already be wrong by the time it was pasted. Later in the day it also began capturing the card number, expiry date and security code typed into a site’s own payment form, although cards entered in hosted payment boxes such as Stripe’s were out of reach. When it swapped an address, it also sent off the page’s readable cookies and a screenshot. On Apple‘s mobile devices it loaded two known iOS exploit kits, Coruna and DarkSword, which target older versions of the system.

The damage anyone can measure so far is small, and some of the alarm deserves a discount. The attacker’s wallets received about $7,040 in roughly nine hours, by Report URI’s count; StepSecurity put the figure nearer $6,600 and noted that two of the addresses were in use before the attack began. Nobody can yet say how many card numbers or cookies left. No researcher has reported a single iPhone actually taken over: Cynet, which captured the iOS stage using an emulated browser, called it conditional delivery, “not a successful compromise” of a real device. Report URI also sells tools that detect exactly this kind of attack, as Gizmodo pointed out. And Optimizely’s incident notice still does not say how many projects were altered or how the flaw worked.

The attack also shows how little a website’s own defences help when the supplier is the problem. HSBC’s security policy blocked the main malicious file, according to Report URI, but a backup copy hidden inside the snippet still ran, because the bank allowed a setting that Optimizely’s documentation tells customers to switch on. Smartsheet’s snippet was cleaned once and then infected again, a sign the attacker still had access at that point. Optimizely itself disclosed a separate breach in February, which exposed basic business contact details after a voice-phishing call.

The first injection appeared at 04:21 UTC on 16 November, in the BBC’s snippet, and the card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC. Report URI says every infected Optimizely file was clean by 23:11 UTC that night, and the attacker’s main server stopped resolving early on 17 November. Anyone who visited an affected site that day should install the latest iOS on iPhones and iPads (the kits’ own code lists iOS 18.7.3 and iOS 26.3 onward as patched), compare any crypto payment with the address they meant to pay, and watch card statements for charges they do not recognise.

Salesforce has switched off Optimizely scripts on its sites while it investigates and says it will tell customers if it finds their data was reached. Optimizely has yet to explain how one flaw in a signup page handed a stranger the power to rewrite code running on the websites of 178 unrelated companies.

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